Where to Make the Cut: Does Zizek have a Statist Fetish?
In Slavoj Zizek’s “In Defense of Lost Causes” I came upon the following paragraph, a paragraph that I believe encapsulates both Zizek’s strength as a Lacanian and his weakness as a Marxist:
Recall the classical Marxist account of the overcoming of capitalism: capitalism unleashed the breath-taking dynamics of self-enhancing productivity – in capitalism, “all things solid melt into thin air,” capitalism is the greatest revolutionizer in the entire history of humanity; on the other hand, this capitalist dynamics is propelled by its own inner obstacle or antagonism – the ultimate limit of capitalism (of the capitalist self-propelling productivity) is the Capital itself, i.e. the capitalist incessant development and revolutionizing of its own material conditions, the mad dance of its unconditional spiral of productivity, is ultimately nothing but a desperate flight forward to escape its own debilitating inherent contradiction… Marx’s fundamental mistake was here to conclude, from these insights, that a new, higher social order (Communism) is possible, an order that would not only maintain, but even raise to a higher degree and effectively fully release the potential of the self-increasing spiral of productivity which, in capitalism, on account of its inherent obstacle/contradiction, is again and again thwarted by socially destructive economic crises. In short, what Marx overlooked is that, to put it in the standard Derridean terms, this inherent obstacle/antagonism as the “condition of impossibility” of the full deployment of the productive forces is simultaneously its “condition of possibility”: if we abolish the obstacle, the inherent contradiction of capitalism, we do not get the fully unleashed drive to productivity finally delivered of its impediment, but we lose precisely this productivity that seemed to be generated and simultaneously thwarted by capitalism – if we take away the obstacle, the very potential thwarted by this obstacle dissipates… And it is as if this logic of “obstacle as a positive condition” which underlied the failure of the socialist attempts to overcome capitalism, is now returning with a vengeance in capitalism itself: capitalism can fully thrive not in the unencumbered reign of the market, but only when an obstacle (the minimal Welfare State interventions, up to the direct political rule of the Communist Party, as is the case in China) constraints its unimpeded reign.
Here we can see why Guy Debord claimed that Lacan was crystalizing the contradictions of Capitalism into ontological categories, however I’m willing to entertain the idea that from a Hegelian perspective wherein ontology is historical we are required to do precisely this. That is in the words of Debord, “we are living in a Society of the Spectacle and all that was directly lived has been transformed into representation.” This means that the ontological basis for our lives has really been transformed into the Spectacle.
My gripe with Zizek then resides elsewhere. The difficulty is where Zizek makes his cut. The central antagonism in Capitalism is not between private Capital and State Power, but rather between the coercive power of production and the liberty of individual consumption. The antagonism that provides the “condition of impossibility” that propels Capital’s production and reproduction is not a choice between two kinds of coercion–the private coercion on the job or the public coercion in the street–but rather the contradiction we are presented with is between private coercion on the job and private freedom in the market. Free choice exists in the market, but this freedom can only be maintained by the coercion and limitations of the class system in production. State power is the excessive intrusive public authority that Capital requires in order to maintain the contradiction between individuality and collectivity, but it is on neither side of the primary contradiction. State Power is shot through both sides of the economic order.
Zizek goes on to claim that Mao’s great mistake was a failure to understand the necessity of the negation of the negation. And without quoting Zizek at length again, nor claiming to fully understand what he is driving at in his Hegelianism, I’ll try to double the negation, or negate both terms on both sides of the contradiction. Would a Communist society be set up wherein production is public or collectively organized in an open and free way while consumption is regulated collectively but coercively? And, if Lacan and Zizek are correct about the split subject of history and the inherent perversity of humanity, would there be some other excess in a communist future? Can we imagine that what might prop up the free collective production of our lives or what the coercive collective consumption of our lives might be like? Just what monsters would real Communism, rather than Maoist State Capitalism, unleash on the world?
***
I’ve changed the video accompanying this post because I think Cooney’s exploration of Value theory is more relevant here than Zizek’s shock therapy on Fascist aesthetics. Given the reaction to this essay so far I think I should clarify two points. First, my presumption is that the Communist hypothesis is the best and perhaps only progressive hypothesis for the future. The Communist hypothesis, as I understand it, is that productive labor does not require exploitation and that social life could be an egalitarian and thus shared project. Communism is first and foremost about the economy, and one of the key insights of Marx is that Capitalist modes of production have political and cultural consequences. The economy is a first principle, not in some casual chain, but in a feedback loop, or a process of dialectics.
However, this Marxism has to rise to the challenge of Lacan and his neo-Hegelian interpreter Zizek who both point out that the structure of reality is such that any given subjectivity has to be split. Zizek further speculates that the Capitalist mode of production is successful precisely because it fits the split subject.
In practical terms the reality of the split subject seems to indicate that symbols of authority (leaders of various stripes) are necessary. I’ll run through Zizek’s argument on strictly Lacanian grounds, or try to.
At lacan.com there is an essay entitled Slavoj Zizek’s Key Ideas, and in this essay there are brief explanations of both the law and symbolic efficiency.
“At the beginning” of the law, there is a certain “outlaw”, a certain real of violence which coincides with the act itself of the establishment of the reign of the law… The illegitimate violence by which law sustains itself must be concealed at any price, because this concealment is the positive condition of the functioning of the law. (For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor)
Any law or symbolic authority requires a cut or an excess simply to exist. To clarify this point we can drop real and living political considerations and be very cold and abstract about the idea which paradoxically liberates us to play around because there is nothing real at stake, right? In that spirit let’s take a look at this work of conceptual art and see if we can figure out what this cut, or excess, is:

What this artwork demonstrates is how language works and doesn’t work. The words are clear enough and have a meaning, and the simple fact that the words label themselves should be clear enough, but there is something wrong here. If there weren’t something wrong that we can almost immediately perceive the work wouldn’t be on the wall at the Portland Art Museum. What’s wrong is that the meaning of the “Five Words in Orange Neon” can not be embodied by five actual orange neon words because the meaning is really split off from the neon. Five Words in Orange Neon need not be five words in literal orange neon in order to communicate, and if in fact they are five actual words in orange neon then they are actually more than they need to be. They are excessive. The medium is stepping on the message here, or the body is overtaking the subject.

But this is always going on. The words I write require some sort of physical trace in order to materialize, and yet the meaning of the words are not contained in the physical trace. The people at Lacan.com explain it this way:
One key aspect of the universalization of reflexivity is the resulting desintegration of the big Other, the communal network of social institutions, customs and laws. For Zizek, the big Other was always dead, in the sense that it never existed in the first place as a material thing. All it ever was (and is) is a purely symbolic order. It means that we all engage in a minimum of idealization, disavowing the brute fact of the Real in favor of another Symbolic world behind it. Zizek expresses this disavowal in terms of an “as if”. In order to coexist with our neighbors we act “as if” they do not smell bad or look ridiculous.
The big key to understanding all of this is that the contradiction is what makes the big Other, or the five orange words in neon, function. That is the meaning and efficiency is always derived out of contradiction and negation. The subject is split.
This is all very fancy, but I imagine that I haven’t resolved the issue of how this relates to the question of the State, democracy, and Communism. Each of these ideas come along with their opposite, with their contradiction. So political democracy is contradicted by economic coercion. One apparently sustains the other. However, I’m arguing that political democracy as opposed to economic coercion is not the contradiction at the heart of Capitalism. I would say that Capitalism has a contradiction that is more basic, and that is between production and consumption, or the factory and the market.
The last line above about imagining monsters is just my perhaps eccentric way of trying to describe what a realizable Communist alternative might be like, and eschew a utopian answer that stays within the realm of Capitalist contradiction.
I’m sharing John’s confusion. I feel as if you’ve gotten so deep into the philosophical implications that you’ve lost track of the practical ones. To you, is capital-C communism democratic? To me and, as I read him, to Marx, it is. Because we trust the people, we trust them to put checks and balances into any implementation of communism.
Doug:
I might personally agree with your proposition that “our society is not one characterized by [direct] democratic political institutions, but rather real direct democracy is visible only in the market. However, this freedoms negation is in production.”
But my agreement with you about this would seem to be based on our sharing a desire for democratic freedom manifest in more than merely the marketplace, where we can see even the democratic freedom of consumer choice being negated or contradicted by our own being forced to produce the cycle.
My question would be: even if democratic freedom is contradicted here, should we expect that this contradiction has motive force to create desire in people for radical change?
My pessimistic worry is that there are not enough people who desire recognition and self-realization as free individuals over and above undemocratic material satisfaction of wants.
Another way of putting this problem is to say that your emphasis on the desire for freedom is too Hegelian or idealistic and not really Marxist or materialistic.
It is ironic that if we follow Marx’s more rigorous materialism we have to grant that the people may accept unfreedom so long as they are materially satiated.
And if we follow Hegel’s more idealistic desire for recognition as motive force than we may not have enough genuine freedom seeking individuals to make a case for mass political effects.
You say that Marx has to rise to the challenge of Lacan and Zizek.. but, I might take the reverse- which is to say to what extent do Lacan and Zizek really offer us a revolutionary perspective? And to what extent are they as Guy Debord said of Lacan, crystallizing (or reifying) the contradictions of capitalism into ontological structures?
Even within a dialectical history of ontology, it seems to me that a revolutionary perspective would be attempting to reconcile the estranged nature of human labor within this historical phase of capitalism in which we find ourselves.. but it seems to me that Lacan and Zizek offer a symbolic unity of and within division.
In this, Lacan and Zizek reinvest us with a reiteration of original sin in casting the subject from the paradise of the real into our fallen symbolic order. As priestly excess, they can cut their bourgeois position out by taking their spectacular role of theory of the theory of theory specialization which demand that we split our subject and accept the cut of their position, and internalize their contradictions which mirror the contradictions at root of capital.
Reflected, we could represent this as the abyss between the use value of theory- internally within a body of praxis and it’s reversal as exchange value as cultural commodity. The division they present is unitary, while the unity they present is divided.
“the structure of reality is such that any given subjectivity has to be split. Zizek further speculates that the Capitalist mode of production is successful precisely because it fits the split subject. In practical terms the reality of the split subject seems to indicate that symbols of authority (leaders of various stripes) are necessary.”
This unity of necessity necessitates it’s own specialist position within the global division of spectacular tasks. To pontificate on a unreachable synthesis, is to occupy an abyss where the irony of the contradictions inherent within that representation serve as another mode of production for the spectacle and the inversion of life. This reversal seems to reify and reinforce the shock trauma condition of the post-modern spectacle so that the symbolic surface becomes the totality of experience. The violence of the shock of this experience is thus internalized/ontologized.
So- I question the affect of this discourse on our capacities for non-coercive collectivized modalities of self-representation of the proleteriat as the subject of history. Zizek denies us synthesis within our hegelian dialectic of history but insist that we must still be hegelian somehow.. he insists that communism is impossible, humans are fallen, that the only historical inevitablity is monsters.. but Zizek says he is a monster so he argues for monsters perhaps so we see the disruptive irony of this psuedo-synthesis-non-synthesis as the historical inevitability. He says that he is not a human.. but Karl Marx was writing about communism for the liberation of humanity from monsters which would alienate humanity from it’s ‘species-being’.
As a worker with calloused hands and an occupied existence, I ask, what is this discourse pointing us towards? How does it help us in our struggle? Instead of trying to imagine something so ironic as democratic coercion, perhaps we can look towards extant models (the IWW) of the democratic organization of material economy which prefigures democratic political economy. I don’t think that libertarian socialist modes of praxis have failed theoretically so much as have been censored, killed, and violently cut by symbolic authorities out of history by ‘liberal capitalist democracy” on one side and “authoritarian centralized communism” (state capitalism) on the other.
Perhaps, we would do well to draw a distinction between coercive authority, which I think the historical dialectic has shown to be a farce and reactionary- ultimately.. or an authority from below which is immanent and originates collectively.
zizek’s also kind of racist:
http://qlipoth.blogspot.com/2010/11/zizeks-protocols.html
http://leninology.blogspot.com/2011/01/moving-on-from-zizek-or-not.html#disqus_thread
How can he be called a marxist if he doesn’t respect the people he’s supposed to root for?





Your final sentence betrays an aversion to the initial subject–that is to say, you already assume that Communism will unleash monsters–without you actually proving your point beforehand. You stated (soft) propositions, but never actually reached a definite conclusion.
This is, I feel, at most, quibbling.